CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

DOI10.1142/S0218127409025201zbMath1182.91036OpenAlexW1987665758MaRDI QIDQ5305168

Christian Hilbe

Publication date: 19 March 2010

Published in: International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218127409025201

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theoryprisoner's dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Dynamic noise from action errors enhances network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Unnamed Item

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