CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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Publication:5305168
DOI10.1142/S0218127409025201zbMath1182.91036OpenAlexW1987665758MaRDI QIDQ5305168
Publication date: 19 March 2010
Published in: International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218127409025201
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