Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
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Publication:2013504
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.09.017zbMATH Open1368.91028arXiv1610.07406OpenAlexW2521604916WikidataQ47378387 ScholiaQ47378387MaRDI QIDQ2013504FDOQ2013504
Authors: Su Do Yi, Seung Ki Baek, Jung-Kyoo Choi 
Publication date: 8 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07406
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Cited In (5)
- Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons
- Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games
- A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader
- Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
- Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
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