Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.09.017MaRDI QIDQ2013504zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Su Do Yi, Seung Ki Baek, Jung-Kyoo Choi

Publication date 8 August 2017

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07406

zbMATH Keywords

memoryprisoner's dilemmareciprocityevolution of cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Abstract: One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.

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Cited in

(5)

• Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons
• Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games
• A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader
• Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies

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