Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2013504
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.09.017zbMath1368.91028arXiv1610.07406OpenAlexW2521604916WikidataQ47378387 ScholiaQ47378387MaRDI QIDQ2013504
Su Do Yi, Seung Ki Baek, Jung-Kyoo Choi
Publication date: 8 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07406
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