Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
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Publication:2079287
DOI10.1007/s43069-022-00159-3zbMath1498.91046arXiv2012.10231OpenAlexW4294609255MaRDI QIDQ2079287
Publication date: 29 September 2022
Published in: SN Operations Research Forum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.10231
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