Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1073/PNAS.1206569109MaRDI QIDQ4907498zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Alexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin

Publication date 2 February 2013

Published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206569109

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• An interpretation and proof of the fundamental theorem of natural selection
• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(35)

• Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolution of cooperation in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma games under localized extremal dynamics
• What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations
• A study of prisoner's dilemma game model with incomplete information
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
• Memory-based prisoner's dilemma game with conditional selection on networks
• Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games
• Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournament
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Autocratic strategies for alternating games
• Optimal administrative response to selfish behaviors in urban public management: the role of zero-determinant strategies
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
• Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule
• Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game
• A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader
• Interaction stochasticity may hinder cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games
• Evolving novelty strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma in deceptive tournaments
• External pressure on alliances: what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?
• The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games
• Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
• Evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
• A Matrix Approach to Generalizing Axelrod-Type Tournaments
• Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner's dilemma
• Quantization and experimental realization of the Colonel Blotto game
• Asymmetric iterated prisoner's dilemma on weighted complex networks and evolutionary strategies analysis
• Coordinating team players within a noisy iterated prisoner's dilemma tournament

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