Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2015.02.080zbMath1400.91051MaRDI QIDQ1618441

P. M. Hui, Y. Li, Jie Liu, Chen Xu

Publication date: 13 November 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2015.02.080

zbMATH Keywords

iterated prisoner's dilemma; evolutionary games; structured populations; zero-determinant strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata, Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games, Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game, Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games, Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game, Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Cites Work

• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma