The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.05.004zbMATH Open1412.91004OpenAlexW1965259119WikidataQ47877027 ScholiaQ47877027MaRDI QIDQ2415596FDOQ2415596

Jing Chen, Aleksey Zinger

Publication date: 23 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative behavioradapting pathadapting player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
• On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Evolution of Representation in Simple Cognitive Networks
• The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Good Strategies and Their Dynamics

Cited In (12)

• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game
• Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games
• Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games
• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader
• Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
• Finding best counterstrategies for generalized iterated prisoner's dilemma games
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Generalizing Pure and Impure Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas to the Case of Infinite and Infinitesimal Quantities

This page was built for publication: The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2415596)