Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games
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Publication:2140026
DOI10.1007/S00285-022-01758-8zbMath1489.91023arXiv2111.14246OpenAlexW3217639513WikidataQ113905362 ScholiaQ113905362MaRDI QIDQ2140026
Publication date: 20 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.14246
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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