Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games

DOI10.1007/S00285-022-01758-8zbMath1489.91023arXiv2111.14246OpenAlexW3217639513WikidataQ113905362 ScholiaQ113905362MaRDI QIDQ2140026

Arjun Mirani, Alex McAvoy

Publication date: 20 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.14246

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Stochastic Games
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