Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015zbMath1400.91054OpenAlexW1995714727WikidataQ43212042 ScholiaQ43212042MaRDI QIDQ1798642

Martin A. Nowak, Hisashi Ohtsuki, David G. Rand

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2614626

zbMATH Keywords

evolutioncomputer simulationcooperationreciprocitypunishmentfinite population size analysisNash equilibrium analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (20)

Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma ⋮ Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity ⋮ Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games ⋮ An intermediate number of neighbors promotes the emergence of generous tit-for-tat players on homogeneous networks ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ The evolution of coercive institutional punishment ⋮ Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment ⋮ Direct reciprocity in structured populations ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with abductive reasoning ⋮ On the spread of charitable behavior in a social network: a model based on game theory ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of a system with periodic coefficients ⋮ Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation? ⋮ Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game ⋮ Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Limit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Shared outrage and erratic awards: the psychology of punitive damages
• Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• Active linking in evolutionary games
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• A theory of group selection.

This page was built for publication: Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails