Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
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Publication:1798642
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Cites work
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- A theory of group selection.
- Active linking in evolutionary games
- Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Game theory
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126094 (Why is no real title available?)
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
- Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
- Shared outrage and erratic awards: the psychology of punitive damages
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- The evolution of cooperation
- The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
Cited in
(22)- Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation
- Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
- Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
- Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas
- Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games
- Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types
- Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
- Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
- An intermediate number of neighbors promotes the emergence of generous tit-for-tat players on homogeneous networks
- The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
- Limit cycles sparked by mutation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- Indirect reciprocity with abductive reasoning
- On the spread of charitable behavior in a social network: a model based on game theory
- Evolutionary dynamics of a system with periodic coefficients
- Cooperation under endogenous punishment in the spatial public goods game
- Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
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