Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:803080
DOI10.1016/0040-5809(90)90005-GzbMATH Open0726.92015OpenAlexW2027398667MaRDI QIDQ803080FDOQ803080
Authors: Martin A. Nowak 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(90)90005-g
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cooperationevolutionary stabilityselection pressurestochastic strategiesinfinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmamutation-selection forcesNash solutionsstability against invasionTit-for- Tat strategy
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