Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
From MaRDI portal
Publication:803080
DOI10.1016/0040-5809(90)90005-GzbMath0726.92015OpenAlexW2027398667MaRDI QIDQ803080
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(90)90005-g
evolutionary stabilitycooperationselection pressurestochastic strategiesinfinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmamutation-selection forcesNash solutionsstability against invasionTit-for- Tat strategy
Related Items
Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma, Spatial patterns and scale freedom in Prisoner’s Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies, Dynamically stable multiple strategy states of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies, Game-dynamical aspects of the prisoner's dilemma, Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity, Exploring the cooperative regimes in an agent-based model: indirect reciprocity vs. selfish incentives, Reactive means in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma, Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions, A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader, Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons, Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure, On the iterated prisoner's dilemma in a finite population, Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games, How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence, Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat, Iterated snowdrift game among mobile agents with myopic expected-reward based decision rule: numerical and analytical research, Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails, Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria, An escape from ``the prisoner's dilemma, Optimizing the mutual intelligibility of linguistic agents in a shared world
Cites Work
