Spatial patterns and scale freedom in Prisoner’s Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies
DOI10.1088/1742-5468/2005/01/P01010zbMath1072.82544arXivcond-mat/0412737OpenAlexW1968551550WikidataQ62476795 ScholiaQ62476795MaRDI QIDQ3160147
Publication date: 1 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0412737
cellular automatagame-theoryinteracting agent modelsapplications to game theory and mathematical economics
Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory (60K35) Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Neural nets applied to problems in time-dependent statistical mechanics (82C32)
Related Items (5)
Cites Work
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- Optimization by Simulated Annealing
- Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
- Non-cooperative games
- Self-organized criticality
- Evolutionary games and computer simulations.
- MORE SPATIAL GAMES
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
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