Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2018.04.027MaRDI QIDQ1715265zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek

Publication date 4 February 2019

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.06984

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationpublic-goods gamereciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Abstract: Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated $n$-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of implementation error with a guarantee that the resulting payoff will be no less than any of the co-players'. By enumerating strategic possibilities for $n=3$, we show that such a strategy indeed exists when its memory length $m$ equals three. It means that a deterministic strategy can be publicly employed to stabilize cooperation against error with avoiding the risk of being exploited. We furthermore show that, for general $n$-person public-goods game, $mgeqn$ is necessary to satisfy the above criteria.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(9)

• Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation
• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
• The effect of individual attitude on cooperation in social dilemma
• Using rewards reasonably: the effects of stratified-rewards in public goods game
• Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty
• Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
• Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
• Preventing the tragedy of the commons through punishment of over-consumers and encouragement of under-consumers

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