Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1942932
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.022zbMath1258.91046MaRDI QIDQ1942932
Publication date: 14 March 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.022
Cites Work
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction and local communication