Social Norms and Community Enforcement
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Publication:3988997
DOI10.2307/2297925zbMath0763.90109OpenAlexW2056700716WikidataQ48913525 ScholiaQ48913525MaRDI QIDQ3988997
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f98e69f9cefeb8eb7998ea5fcad3ea211018b39d
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