Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.12.003zbMath1530.91172OpenAlexW4389751365MaRDI QIDQ6188686

József Sákovics, Helmut Bester

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

competitionmatchingcooperationwelfareprisoner's dilemmatrust building

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Competition fosters trust
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Sequential Equilibria
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Observations on Cooperation
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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