Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80006-5zbMath0822.90148MaRDI QIDQ1804642

Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date: 11 June 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social interactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (7)

A cellular model of prisoners dilemma for ``prodding gratuity ⋮ Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ Optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ HELPING BEHAVIOR IN LARGE SOCIETIES ⋮ Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market ⋮ Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication ⋮ Community enforcement using modal actions

Cites Work

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• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination
• Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma
• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Social norms and random matching games
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching

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