A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations

DOI10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7zbMATH Open0426.92025OpenAlexW2048876447MaRDI QIDQ1136727FDOQ1136727

Authors: Henry Landau, Robert W. Rosenthal 

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsupergamesocial equilibriumsocial Darwinism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical psychology (91E99) 2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Finite state Markovian decision processes
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents

Cited In (9)

• Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
• Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment
• A model of far-sighted electoral competition
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning
• Anonymous sequential games
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences

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