A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations

DOI10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7MaRDI QIDQ1136727zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Henry Landau, Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date 1979

Published in Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsupergamesocial equilibriumsocial Darwinism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical psychology (91E99) 2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites work

• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Finite state Markovian decision processes
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(9)

• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
• Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment
• Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
• A model of far-sighted electoral competition
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning
• Anonymous sequential games
• Reputation and imperfect information

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