A model of far-sighted electoral competition

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)91083-6MaRDI QIDQ1162269zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date 1982

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)91083-6

zbMATH Keywords

far-sighted electoral competitionsequences of election contestssymmetric steady-state equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
• Finite state Markovian decision processes
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents

Cited in

(1)

• Anonymous sequential games

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