Reputation and imperfect information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- The chain store paradox
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- Reputation with noisy precommitment
- The influence of social norms and social consciousness on intention reconciliation.
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- Signaling games
- Timing games with irrational types: leverage-driven bubbles and crash-contingent claims
- Signaling quality through price guarantee window for technology-related products
- A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY
- THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
- Collaboration dynamics of R\&D teams: theory and experiment
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Sanctions as revelation regimes
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Competition fosters trust
- Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.
- Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
- Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
- BACKWARD INDUCTION OR FORWARD REASONING? – AN EXPERIMENT OF STOCHASTIC ALTERNATING OFFER BARGAINING
- Optimal entry deterrence under uncertainty
- Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
- Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
- Bayesian repeated games and reputation
- Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
- Dynamic persuasion
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- The signaling effect of raising inflation
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- The war of attrition with incomplete information
- Social preferences? Google answers!
- Building trust -- one gift at a time
- Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies
- The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
- Embedding trust: a game-theoretic model for investments in and returns on network embeddedness
- A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration
- Informal communication
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition
- Reputation with observed actions
- A generalization of the backward induction method in aligned games
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions
- Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
- Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
- Evolving wars of attrition
- Relational Nash equilibrium and interrelationships among relational and rational equilibrium concepts
- Intentional time inconsistency
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
- Protests and reputation
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy
- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Building rational cooperation
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
- Collective mass media bias, social media, and non-partisans
- Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- Repeated signaling games
- Reputation building through costly adjustment
- A Reputation Game Simulation: Emergent Social Phenomena from Information Theory
- The role of brand spillover on firm's sourcing and contract decisions
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Similarities and differences when building trust: the role of cultures
- A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
- Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournament
- Why should reform wait until things get really bad?
- Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit
- Order of limits in reputations
- Habit forming consumers and firm dynamics
- Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
- A model of gradual information disclosure
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
- Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods.
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- Reputation-based persuasion platforms
- The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
- Judicial torture as a screening device
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