Reputation and imperfect information
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- The chain store paradox
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
- Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- Limit games and limit equilibria
- The chain-store paradox revisited
- Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Imperfect equilibrium
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies
- A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- The war of attrition with incomplete information
- Reputation with noisy precommitment
- Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
- Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.
- Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
- Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
- Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
- Dynamic persuasion
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- The signaling effect of raising inflation
- Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
- Collective mass media bias, social media, and non-partisans
- Judicial torture as a screening device
- One-sided games in a war of attrition
- Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
- Consistent linkages across markets
- The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem
- Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
- Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- Reputation with observed actions
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- A differential game between government and firms: A non-cooperative approach
- On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
- The influence of social norms and social consciousness on intention reconciliation.
- Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods.
- Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournament
- Why should reform wait until things get really bad?
- Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy
- The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria
- Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- Reputation from nested activities
- Similarities and differences when building trust: the role of cultures
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- A model of gradual information disclosure
- Timing games with irrational types: leverage-driven bubbles and crash-contingent claims
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration
- On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- Ransomware and reputation
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Building trust -- one gift at a time
- Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
- Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
- What to maximize if you must
- Repeated signaling games
- Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- Reputation building through costly adjustment
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Social preferences? Google answers!
- Object-oriented Bayesian networks for a decision support system for antitrust enforcement
- Causal discourse in a game of incomplete information
- Information asymmetry and reentry
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Building rational cooperation
- A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
- Intentional time inconsistency
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- Resource inequality in the war of attrition
- Order of limits in reputations
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY
- THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3939137 (Why is no real title available?)
- Competition fosters trust
- A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
- Reputation effects
- Signaling games
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- Embedding trust: a game-theoretic model for investments in and returns on network embeddedness
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
This page was built for publication: Reputation and imperfect information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1164554)
