Reputation and imperfect information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
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- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- The chain store paradox
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem
- What to maximize if you must
- Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
- Object-oriented Bayesian networks for a decision support system for antitrust enforcement
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
- Reputation from nested activities
- Ransomware and reputation
- Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
- Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
- A differential game between government and firms: A non-cooperative approach
- Reputation effects
- Resource inequality in the war of attrition
- Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- Characterizing agent behavior in revision games with uncertain deadline
- On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
- Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- Causal discourse in a game of incomplete information
- When is reputation bad?
- Equilibrium effects of pay transparency
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent
- A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3939137 (Why is no real title available?)
- Imperfect equilibrium
- The chain-store paradox revisited
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
- On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- Reputation with noisy precommitment
- The influence of social norms and social consciousness on intention reconciliation.
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- Signaling games
- Timing games with irrational types: leverage-driven bubbles and crash-contingent claims
- Signaling quality through price guarantee window for technology-related products
- A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY
- THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Sanctions as revelation regimes
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Competition fosters trust
- Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.
- Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
- Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
- BACKWARD INDUCTION OR FORWARD REASONING? – AN EXPERIMENT OF STOCHASTIC ALTERNATING OFFER BARGAINING
- Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
- Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
- Bayesian repeated games and reputation
- Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
- Dynamic persuasion
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- The signaling effect of raising inflation
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- The war of attrition with incomplete information
- Social preferences? Google answers!
- Building trust -- one gift at a time
- Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies
- The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
- Embedding trust: a game-theoretic model for investments in and returns on network embeddedness
- A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration
- Informal communication
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Reputation with observed actions
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
- Relational Nash equilibrium and interrelationships among relational and rational equilibrium concepts
- Intentional time inconsistency
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
- Protests and reputation
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy
- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Building rational cooperation
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
- Collective mass media bias, social media, and non-partisans
- Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- Reputation and impermanent types
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