A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0050-YzbMATH Open1276.91030OpenAlexW2141244322MaRDI QIDQ385167FDOQ385167

Authors: Chee Kian Leong 

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0050-y

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zbMATH Keywords

reputationeconomic performancenondemocracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Introduction to modern economic growth.
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Contraction Mappings in the Theory Underlying Dynamic Programming
• The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
• Bad Reputation
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited In (3)

• Protests and reputation
• When will a dictator be good?
• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)

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