Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.09.008MaRDI QIDQ2345220zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Selçuk Özyurt

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingbehavioral typesconflict resolutioninternational conflicts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information

Cited in

(3)

• Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
• Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively
• Reputational bargaining with external resolution opportunities

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