Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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Cites work
- Agreeing to disagree
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and imperfect information
- The chain store paradox
Cited in
(85)- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- Reputation with noisy precommitment
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- Signaling games
- Poisson-Cournot games
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?
- Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Quality distortions in vertical relations
- Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
- Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
- Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
- The signaling effect of raising inflation
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- Social preferences? Google answers!
- Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies
- To fight or not to fight? That is the question
- A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration
- Informal communication
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Reputation with observed actions
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
- Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
- Building rational cooperation
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Entry and espionage with noisy signals
- Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land
- Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Reputation building through costly adjustment
- A Reputation Game Simulation: Emergent Social Phenomena from Information Theory
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
- Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournament
- Why should reform wait until things get really bad?
- Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit
- Order of limits in reputations
- A model of gradual information disclosure
- The implications of pricing on social learning
- Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
- The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria
- Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
- Judicial torture as a screening device
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Expert's reputation concern and consumer information
- Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Information asymmetry and reentry
- What to maximize if you must
- Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
- Reputation from nested activities
- Ransomware and reputation
- Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production
- Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- When is reputation bad?
- Equilibrium effects of pay transparency
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes
- Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
- The chain-store paradox revisited
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
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