Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00913-0zbMath0903.90043WikidataQ115564570 ScholiaQ115564570MaRDI QIDQ1391388

Toshikazu Kawakami, Yoshida Yoshihiro

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

predationrepeated gamecollusionfinancial constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames