Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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Publication:1164528
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-XzbMath0485.90013OpenAlexW2112130001WikidataQ56481602 ScholiaQ56481602MaRDI QIDQ1164528
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x
asymmetric informationpredationreputationfirm behaviorentry deterrencemarket entrygame-theoretic equilibrium analysis
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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Cites Work
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and imperfect information
- The chain store paradox
- Agreeing to disagree
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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