Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
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Cites work
- A Theory of Credibility
- Bargaining and reputation: an experiment on bargaining in the presence of behavioural types
- Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
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- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
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- Starting small and renegotiation
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- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
Cited in
(5)- Incremental approaches to establishing trust
- Similarities and differences when building trust: the role of cultures
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
- Choice flexibility and long-run cooperation
- A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: theory and experimental evidence
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