Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2389305


DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.003zbMath1165.91317MaRDI QIDQ2389305

Jack Ochs, John Duffy

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4122247000000000060.pdf


91A12: Cooperative games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A90: Experimental studies


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