Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games
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- Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
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- Game theory
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
Cited in
(8)- Cooperation by indirect revelation through strategic behavior
- When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
- Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
- Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
- An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
- Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
- Tacit coordination in Choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries
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