Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0860MaRDI QIDQ700108zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John B. Van Huyck, John M. Wildenthal, Raymond C. Battalio

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3817ace531263ce834a661b9146ed7ad1649883f

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A $k$-Sample Model in Order Statistics
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Focal points and bargaining
• Game theory
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

Cited in

(8)

• Cooperation by indirect revelation through strategic behavior
• When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
• Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
• An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
• Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
• Tacit coordination in Choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries

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