Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0860zbMATH Open1015.91508OpenAlexW1994673994MaRDI QIDQ700108FDOQ700108

Authors: John B. Van Huyck, John M. Wildenthal, Raymond C. Battalio 

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3817ace531263ce834a661b9146ed7ad1649883f

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• A $k$-Sample Model in Order Statistics
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Game theory
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
• Focal points and bargaining

Cited In (8)

• Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Tacit coordination in Choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
• Cooperation by indirect revelation through strategic behavior
• When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
• An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
• Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence

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