On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games

DOI10.1007/BF01240042MaRDI QIDQ1897346zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Raymond C. Battalio, Sondip Mathur, Patsy Van Huyck, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date 27 August 1995

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240042

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive learningdynamical systems approachhuman behaviorsymmetric bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Focal points and bargaining
• Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
• Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game

Cites work

• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679839 (Why is no real title available?)
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(10)

• Focal points and bargaining
• Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
• When learning meets salience
• On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict
• No switchbacks: Rethinking aspiration-based dynamics in the ultimatum game
• (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
• Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: Evidence from similar bargaining games
• Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Mathematica

This page was built for publication: On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1897346)