On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.006zbMath1294.91041OpenAlexW2119264435MaRDI QIDQ2016217

Francisco Lagos, Frans van Winden, Juan A. Lacomba, Ernesto Reuben

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.956.6863

zbMATH Keywords

escalationtournamentscontestsconflictrent-seekingappropriationpeace

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict ⋮ Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: an experiment

Cites Work

• Brothers in arms -- an experiment on the alliance puzzle
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• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
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• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
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• Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter
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