Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90030-IzbMath0825.90812OpenAlexW2099444617MaRDI QIDQ1194054

S. Singh

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90030-i

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Related Items (9)

On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games ⋮ Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: experimental evidence from Germany and China ⋮ On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining ⋮ Thresholds, productivity, and context: an experimental study on determinants of distributive behaviour ⋮ Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study ⋮ A backward induction experiment ⋮ Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information ⋮ Focal points and bargaining ⋮ Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points

Cites Work

• Multivariate generalizations of the Wald-Wolfowitz and Smirnov two-sample tests
• Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• An omnibus test for the two-sample problem using the empirical characteristic function
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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