Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
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Cites work
- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Exchange processes with price adjustment
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
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(24)- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Instability of mixed Nash equilibria in generalised hawk-dove game: a project conflict management scenario
- Experiments on individual strategy updating in iterated snowdrift game under random rematching
- Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
- Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?
- Continuous-time strategy selection in linear population games
- Bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game
- Best response game of traffic on road network of non-signalized intersections
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- The iterated hawk-dove game revisited: the effect of ownership uncertainty on bourgeois as a pure convention
- Communication and visibility in public goods provision
- Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time
- Collective action: experimental evidence
- Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
- Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information
- A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
- Universalization and altruism
- Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game
- Beyond Hawks and Doves: can inequality ease coordination?
- Stable mixing in hawk-dove games under best experienced payoff dynamics
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