Experiments on individual strategy updating in iterated snowdrift game under random rematching
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.12.008zbMath1405.91095OpenAlexW2094847299WikidataQ50611312 ScholiaQ50611312MaRDI QIDQ1664538
Ning Jia, Guangchao Wang, Hang Qi, Shoufeng Ma
Publication date: 27 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.12.008
evolutionary game theoryexperimental economicsexperience-weighted attraction learningmatching protocol
Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)
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