Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-XzbMath0827.90146OpenAlexW2009736032WikidataQ56431820 ScholiaQ56431820MaRDI QIDQ1890911

Kenneth G. Binmore, John Gale, Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 28 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80017-x

zbMATH Keywords

ultimatum game subgame-perfect equilibrium interactive learning processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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