Partner selection and the division of surplus: evidence from ultimatum and dictator experiments
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Publication:1651843
DOI10.3390/G7010003zbMath1401.91040OpenAlexW2280826222MaRDI QIDQ1651843
Sanmitra Ghosh, Priyodorshi Banerjee, Sujoy Chakravarty
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010003
partner selectioncompeting promisescredibility and credulitydictator and ultimatum gamesnon-binding communication with intent
Cites Work
- Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis
- Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
- Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
- Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
- Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
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