Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
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Publication:3548512
DOI10.3982/ECTA7673zbMath1154.91365OpenAlexW2155452639MaRDI QIDQ3548512
Publication date: 15 December 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7673
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