Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis
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Publication:608537
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.009zbMath1200.91064OpenAlexW3124643240MaRDI QIDQ608537
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.009
2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)
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