Testing guilt aversion

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.021MaRDI QIDQ844913zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Sigve Tjøtta, Gaute Torsvik

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.021

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsexperimentsgenerosityguilt aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Cites work

• "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
• Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly
• Dynamic psychological games
• How to identify trust and reciprocity.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
• Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Promises and Partnership
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• The self-fulfilling property of trust: an experimental study
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations

Cited in

(34)

• Promises and expectations
• Opportunistic conformism
• Promises, expectations \& causation
• Self-interest and equity concerns: a behavioural allocation rule for operational problems
• Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly
• Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach
• When do the expectations of others matter? Experimental evidence on distributional justice and guilt aversion
• Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority
• The rationale of in-group favoritism: an experimental test of three explanations
• Communication, expectations, and trust: an experiment with three media
• Testing the causes of betrayal aversion
• Versatile forward guidance: escaping or switching?
• Teams promise but do not deliver
• Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of biased beliefs and distributional other-regarding preferences
• The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
• Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
• Communication and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games
• Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence
• Exploiting the guilt aversion of others: do agents do it and is it effective?
• Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs
• Behavioral influences on strategic interactions outcomes in game theory models
• Do lies erode trust?
• Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
• A note on testing guilt aversion
• Guilt moderation
• Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis
• Paying it forward: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity
• Guilt aversion in (new) games: does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
• The framing of games and the psychology of play
• Guilt and shame: An axiomatic analysis
• Moral emotions and beliefs influence charitable giving
• Public good provision with a governor
• Surprising gifts: theory and laboratory evidence
• Bare promises: an experiment

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