Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.008OpenAlexW3190697871MaRDI QIDQ2685834

Mengxing Wei, Sanjit Dhami, Ali al-Nowaihi

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocitypsychological game theorygift exchangebelief-based modelsguilt-aversionindustry wage and effort norms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Labor markets (91B39)

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