Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.11.003MaRDI QIDQ1735771zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Luca Polonio, Giorgio Coricelli

Publication date 29 March 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsbounded rationalityeye-trackinggame theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Decision theory for games (91A35) Experimental studies (91A90)

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• Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: a methodological inquiry and experimental test
• Strategic sophistication and attention in games: an eye-tracking study
• The framing of games and the psychology of play
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations

Cited in

(8)

• A window of cognition: eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games
• Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice
• Plasticity of strategic sophistication in interactive decision-making
• Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence
• Imperfect choice or imperfect attention? Understanding strategic thinking in private information games
• Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making
• Attempting to detect a lie: do we think it through?
• Strategic sophistication and attention in games: an eye-tracking study

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Uses Software

• mclust

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