Identification of non-equilibrium beliefs in games of incomplete information using experimental data

DOI10.1515/jem-2019-0029zbMath1462.62712OpenAlexW3014557966MaRDI QIDQ2661326

Erhao Xie, Victor Aguirregabiria

Publication date: 7 April 2021

Published in: Journal of Econometric Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/jem-2019-0029

zbMATH Keywords

games of incomplete informationcoordination gamebiased beliefsstrategic uncertaintyutility of money

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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