Identification of non-equilibrium beliefs in games of incomplete information using experimental data
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Publication:2661326
DOI10.1515/jem-2019-0029zbMath1462.62712OpenAlexW3014557966MaRDI QIDQ2661326
Erhao Xie, Victor Aguirregabiria
Publication date: 7 April 2021
Published in: Journal of Econometric Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/jem-2019-0029
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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