Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
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Publication:2271364
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010zbMath1166.91310OpenAlexW2012706305MaRDI QIDQ2271364
Thomas R. Palfrey, Colin F. Camerer, Brian W. Rogers
Publication date: 7 August 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79668/
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical economics (91B99) Cognitive psychology (91E10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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