A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies
- Cournot duopoly with two production periods
- Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
- Estimating the dimension of a model
- Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
- Market instability in a Stackelberg duopoly
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
Cited in
(6)- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Cognitive hierarchy theory and two-person games
- A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games
- Chaotic dynamics in nonlinear duopoly Stackelberg game with heterogeneous players
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