A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game
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Publication:403969
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0395-5zbMath1297.91007OpenAlexW1998137039MaRDI QIDQ403969
Daniel Carvalho, Luís Santos-Pinto
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/324919/files/182_2013_Article_395.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cognitive psychology (91E10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Games of timing (91A55)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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- Market instability in a Stackelberg duopoly
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