A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0395-5zbMATH Open1297.91007OpenAlexW1998137039MaRDI QIDQ403969FDOQ403969
Authors: Daniel Carvalho, Luís Santos-Pinto 
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/324919/files/182_2013_Article_395.pdf
Recommendations
Cognitive psychology (91E10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games of timing (91A55) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
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Cited In (5)
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