Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained

DOI10.2307/2526838zbMath0714.90010OpenAlexW2005247087MaRDI QIDQ3200847

Arthur J. Robson

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526838

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriaprice-setting duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (15)

Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games ⋮ Endogenous price leadership ⋮ DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP ⋮ A note on the endogenous timing of tariff policy in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions ⋮ A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game ⋮ What role should public firms play in the upstream market? ⋮ Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games ⋮ Price leadership in a homogeneous product market ⋮ A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE ⋮ Two is not too many for monopoly ⋮ Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm ⋮ A generalized framework for endogenous timing in duopoly games and an application to price-quantity competition ⋮ Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly ⋮ Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium ⋮ Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests

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