Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
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Publication:980977
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012zbMath1230.91116OpenAlexW2024012076MaRDI QIDQ980977
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27651/
strategic complementsendogenous timingStackelbergCournotstrategic substitutesduopoly gameleaderfollower
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items
Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly ⋮ Endogenous price leadership with an essential input ⋮ INFINITE ASYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA IN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES ⋮ Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly ⋮ Dominance hierarchies induce a population's full cooperation
Cites Work
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- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Endogenous price leadership
- First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
- Price Leadership
- DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP
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