Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004zbMath1138.91304MaRDI QIDQ2507850

Rabah Amir, Anna Stepanova

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

price competition; risk dominance; endogenous timing; first/second-mover advantage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

Related Items

Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models, Price leadership in a homogeneous product market, Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note, Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage, Vendor-managed inventory and the effect of channel power, Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information, A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME

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