Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.001zbMATH Open1279.91046OpenAlexW3023592121MaRDI QIDQ417684FDOQ417684

Magnus Hoffmann, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.001

Recommendations

• Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
• Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes
• Asymmetric endogenous prize contests
• Dynamic multi-activity contests
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gamecontestsendogenous timingCournot-Nash gameendogenous prize

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• The theory of contests: a survey
• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
• Contests with multiple rounds
• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• Endogenous timing in two-player games: A counterexample
• Generalized contest success functions
• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
• Peace agreements without commitment
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Population uncertainty in contests
• On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly

Cited In (8)

• Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
• Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations
• Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
• Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games
• Manipulation of moves in sequential contests
• Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
• Cost reduction collaboration between firm and social planner: an economic analysis
• Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament

This page was built for publication: Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q417684)