Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

Cites Work

First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
Contest architecture
Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
Market Structure and Innovation
Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
Contests with multiple rounds
Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
Optimal Auction Design
Contests with rank-order spillovers
Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
Endogenous price leadership
Price Leadership
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
Endogenous timing in two-player games: A counterexample
Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature
The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
Optimal sequential contests

Cited In (1)

Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests

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