First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
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Publication:3750449
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Cited in
(17)- Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
- Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
- Bilateral information sharing in a supply chain with manufacturer competition
- Competitive capacity expansion under demand uncertainty
- Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
- Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly
- On the first mover advantage in Stackelberg quantity games
- Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage
- Entry and espionage with noisy signals
- Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods
- First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
- Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information
- The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example
- A supply chain member should set its margin later if another member's cost is highly uncertain
- Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts
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