DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
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Publication:4521372
DOI10.1142/S0219198900000056zbMath1073.91517OpenAlexW2096026894MaRDI QIDQ4521372
Jörg Oechssler, Karl H. Schlag
Publication date: 2000
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000056
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