DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
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Cites work
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Commitment and observability in games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- Which one should I imitate?
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
Cited in
(7)- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
- First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
- The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
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