An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
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Publication:705876
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.04.005zbMATH Open1121.91007OpenAlexW3125366649MaRDI QIDQ705876FDOQ705876
Authors: D. Kharzeev 
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.005
Recommendations
Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Commitment and observability in games
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
- Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
Cited In (9)
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
- On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games
- The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- Prize-linked savings games: theory and experiment
- From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
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