An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.04.005MaRDI QIDQ705876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. Kharzeev

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

CommitmentCostly leader gamesExperimentsObservation costsStackelberg duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Commitment and observability in games
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games

Cites work

• Commitment and observability in games
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

Cited in

(11)

• Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
• Prize-linked savings games: theory and experiment
• On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
• Strategic commitment to forgo information: evidence from the lab
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly

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