Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games

DOI10.1007/s10100-016-0444-9zbMath1371.91037OpenAlexW2466424841MaRDI QIDQ2401312

Raimo P. Hämäläinen, Ilkka Leppänen

Publication date: 8 September 2017

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/23094

zbMATH Keywords

experimentscooperationprivate informationcheap talkStackelberg game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Uses Software

• S-PLUS
• MEMSS

Cites Work

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